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NOTES

THE BREAKING OF A WAVE: JACOBSEN v. ALLSTATE
INS. CO. AND CLASS CERTIFICATION
Lucas Hamilton*

The breaking of a wave cannot explain the whole sea. . . .1

I. INTRODUCTION
Class actions are the tidal waves of litigation: rare, massive, and
sweeping. Conversely, lawsuits between individual parties are common,
discrete, and narrowly tailored to the facts of the represented parties’ dispute. When challenging well-financed, institutional opposition, individual
suits are unlikely to create broad change beyond the parties involved. Under
the right circumstances, class actions allow individuals to coalesce and
challenge massive opponents like corporations, the government, or even endemic social problems.2 The actions are often costly, bitter court battles
with vast sums or broad social questions at stake. But like a shoaling tidal
wave that grows taller just before landfall, class actions can be indiscriminate, which may pull in unwitting class members and carry them to a final
judgment that is against their best interests. To preemptively break the
surge of an errant class action wave, Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 23
* Lucas Hamilton, Candidate for J.D. 2016, the University of Montana School of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Hillary Wandler and the editors of the Montana Law Review for their
advice and guidance. He would also like to thank Cecelia for her support and encouragement.
1. Vladimir Nabokov, The Real Life of Sebastian Knight 105 (New Directions 1959) (originally
published 1941) (“The breaking of a wave cannot explain the whole sea, from its moon to its serpent;
but a pool in the cup of a rock and the diamond-rippled road to Cathay are both water.”).
2. For example, civil rights cases of the 1950s and 60s challenged both discrimination and the
government institutions in which it grew. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory comm. nn. (1966 amend. to
subdiv. (b)(2)) (listing several civil rights cases against public education institutions).
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and its federal counterpart establish a breakwater—the procedural floor of
class certification.3 Courts presented with class action claims must test the
class for compliance with Rule 23, which serves as a due process barrier to
not only the class opponent, but to putative class members’ individual rights
and interests.
This note analyzes Jacobsen v. Allstate Insurance Co. (Jacobsen II),4 a
case in which the Montana Supreme Court reviewed and ultimately approved certification of a class that challenged Allstate’s allegedly unfair
procedures purportedly intended to hasten, cheapen, and settle claims.5 Unfortunately, the majority’s interpretation of Rule 23 left limited due process
protection for both the defendant and absent class members.6 With an opinion that was both perplexingly cautious and perilously detached, the Court
neither adopted nor rejected U.S. Supreme Court class action precedent
from the Wal-Mart v. Dukes7 decision, and ran roughshod over long-standing due process protections. By restructuring the class, the Court threatens
the viability of future classes following in Jacobsen II’s mold. The analogical wave of the Jacobsen II class rolled on to remand, effectively undermining the policies of Rule 23 and the plaintiff class’s and the defendant company’s respective goals.
Section II of this note looks at the history of class action litigation and
the public policy goals that buttress the modern Rule 23. Section III recites
the factual and procedural background of Jacobsen II and Allstate’s procedures that led to the lawsuit. Section IV analyzes the majority opinion and
the arguments of the two dissents. Section V critiques the majority’s position and offers a policy-driven solution to clear the confusion surrounding
Rule 23. Finally, Section VI concludes with predictions for the future of
class action litigation in Montana after Jacobsen II.
II. THE HISTORY

OF

RULE 23

Courts have delicately described the class action as a “departure” from
a central rule of litigation.8 Normally, lawsuits are conducted by and on
behalf of the named parties.9 The premise of class actions, that parties can
be bound to the judgment of a court in which they never appeared, opposes
3. Mont. R. Civ. P. 23; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
4. 310 P.3d 452 (Mont. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2135 (2014).
5. Id. at 479.
6. Id. at 495 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
7. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
8. See e.g. Id. at 2550; Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 459.
9. Robert H. King, Jr., Four Lessons from Wal-Mart v. Dukes and their Application to Montana
Class Action Law, 73 Mont. L. Rev. 255, 255 (2012).
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long-standing norms.10 Yet class actions have a long history of their own,
which traces back to English Chancery courts where they served as a remedy when joinder of all parties was impracticable.11 In this way, judicial
efficiency has always been a core policy of class action litigation.12
In its earliest incarnation in the United States, the class action only
applied to equity claims and could not be used to recover monetary damages.13 The advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 removed
the distinction between equity and legal claims and made class actions generally available as a civil claim.14 The new procedural rules also ushered in
a wave of class action litigation.15 Some viewed this wave of class litigation
as a boon for justice,16 and others an opportunity for “blackmail settlements.”17 To protect the due process rights of individuals who could be
swept up in the expanded scope of class litigation, both the Montana and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish nearly identical class action certification requirements in Rule 23.18 First, the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)
ensure that a class be large but sufficiently cohesive to justify class treatment.19 Next, the class action must fit into one of the Rule 23(b) categories.20 If the class clears both hurdles, the court can certify the class for
trial.21
A. Rule 23(a) Prerequisites
Rule 23(a) requires that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and
10. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878) (observing the traditional rule that one must be “made fully a party” for judgment to be
binding)).
11. King, supra n. 9, at 258.
12. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 414 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting “the chief purpose
behind the class action device is to achieve a significant measure of judicial economy”).
13. King, supra n. 9, at 258.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. William Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1973).
17. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Henry J.
Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 120 (Columbia Univ. Press 1973)). Congress also acknowledged the benefits and abuses of class actions when it passed the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005. Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005).
18. King, supra n. 9, at 255.
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory comm. nn. (1966 amend. to subdiv. (a)).
20. Id.
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory comm. nn. (1966 amend. to subdiv. (c)(1)).
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(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.22

The current language of Rule 23(a) traces back to the largely uncontroversial 1966 amendments to the federal rules.23 Those amendments, which updated language of the prerequisites and redefined the class action categories, led to an explosion of class action litigation.24 For a time, courts liberally interpreted Rule 23 to certify “tentative” classes that could never be
litigated25 with the hope of producing settlements.26 Consequently, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart decision can be viewed as an attempt to tighten
Rule 23 and limit actions pursued by loosely-related classes.27 In Wal-Mart,
the Court examined the meaning of the commonality requirement, and held
class members must depend upon a “common contention” resolvable in the
class action to fulfill Federal Rule 23(a)(2).28
The underlying facts of the Wal-Mart class action involved allegations
of systemic gender discrimination in Wal-Mart stores across the country.29
The class representatives claimed Wal-Mart favored men for promotions
and higher pay.30 The district court certified a class comprised of 1.5 million women who were past and current employees of the retail giant.31 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed certification, focusing on the plaintiffs’ evidence
suggesting a “single set of corporate policies.”32 The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, found Wal-Mart’s policies allowed individual store managers to
22. Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
23. King, supra n. 9, at 258 (citing Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 387 (1967)).
24. Id. at 255.
25. In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 177 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding “Rule 23 does
not deal specifically with a tentative settlement class. However, a tentative class would appear to be a
form of conditional certification, sanctioned by Rule 23(c)(1).” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 1982); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 738–740
(4th Cir. 1989).
26. The so-called “settlement classes” were commonly certified with the goal of encouraging settlements. Pallister v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., Inc., 285 P.3d 562, 567 (Mont. 2012) (“A
settlement class action is designed to avoid litigation altogether.”). The U.S. Supreme Court curtailed the
use of settlement classes by emphasizing the importance of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and
(b) in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). Today, courts exercise higher scrutiny
when reviewing settlement classes. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that judges must “exercise the highest degree of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions.”).
27. Sangwin v. State, 315 P.3d 279, 284–285 (Mont. 2013) (noting Wal-Mart is a more “stringent”
standard); A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 441, 445 (2013) (describing Wal-Mart as a heightened standard).
28. 131 S. Ct. at 2550–2551; King, supra n. 9, at 281.
29. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011).
30. Id. at 577–578.
31. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
32. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 612.
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use discretion in promoting and setting pay.33 Because store managers did
not use a “common mode of exercising discretion,” the class members were
not united by a common contention resolvable in a class action.34 Thus, the
putative class failed to meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a).35
The common contention requirement tightened the prior “permissive”36 interpretation of the rule’s language.37 In 1993, Montana adopted
the Ninth Circuit’s construction of the permissive standard announced in
McDonald v. Washington and held commonality is satisfied when “a question of law linking the class members is substantially related to the resolution of the litigation.”38 As the Ninth Circuit explained in Jordan v. County
of Los Angeles, this standard follows a long history of class action precedent, which makes the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark Wal-Mart decision a
sea change in Rule 23 interpretation.39 The Montana Supreme Court, however, has declined to decide whether the Wal-Mart standard replaces the
permissive standard under the virtually identical language of the state
rule.40 As a result, the permissive standard, federally overruled by WalMart, is still a valid test for commonality in Montana.41
B. Rule 23(b) Categories
Even if the putative class meets the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), a court
can only certify the class if it falls within one of the three class categories
allowed under Rule 23(b): prejudice classes,42 injunctive classes,43 or dam33. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
34. Id. at 2554–2557.
35. Id. at 2557.
36. Jordan v. Co. of L.A., 669 F.2d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Courts that have analyzed Rule
23(a)(2) have generally given it a permissive application in a variety of substantive law areas so that the
commonality requirement is usually found to be satisfied.”).
37. Sangwin, 315 P.3d 279, 284–285 (Mont. 2013) (noting Wal-Mart is a more “stringent” standard); Spencer, supra n. 27, at 445.
38. 862 P.2d 1150, 1155 (Mont. 1993) (quoting Jordan, 669 F.2d at 1320); King, supra n. 9, at 280.
39. 669 F.2d at 1311, 1320 (citing Am. Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94, 107 (D. Md. 1974);
Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Ests., Inc., 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964); Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes & Checkers, 543 F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 1976)).
40. Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 291 P.3d 1209, 1220–1221 (Mont. 2012).
41. See Sangwin, 315 P.3d at 283–284.
42. The term “prejudice class” has been used by scholars and courts alike to refer to classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1). Dennis Neil Jones et. al., Multiple Punitive Damages Awards for a Single
Course of Wrongful Conduct: The Need for a National Policy to Protect Due Process, 43 Ala. L. Rev. 1,
6 (1991) (citing In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 896
(N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); N. Todd Leishman, Student Author, Juzwin v.
Amtorg Trading Corp.: Toward Due Process Limitations on Multiple Awards of Punitive Damages in
Mass Tort Litigation, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 439, 452–454 (1990).
43. The term “injunctive class” commonly refers to classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2). See Charron v. Pinnacle Group N.Y. LLC, 269 F.R.D. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Butler v. Suffolk Co., 289 F.R.D. 80
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ages classes.44 A prejudice class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) aims to avoid
the prejudicial effect separate actions would have on one another.45 An injunctive class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate when the conduct
of the party opposing the class is such that “final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”46
Finally, a damages class can be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) if “questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members.”47 The categories of Rule
23(b) imply an important caveat to class certification: a class may satisfy
the requirements of 23(a), but should nonetheless be denied class treatment
if it falls outside the bounds of 23(b).48
Prejudice and injunctive classes are considered “mandatory” because
absent class members generally do not have an opportunity to opt out of the
litigation.49 Assuming a class is adequately represented, all members of
mandatory classes are bound to the final judgment, whether good or bad.50
Although a judgment adverse to a mandatory class could extinguish valid
individual claims, binding absent class members does not offend due process because, in theory, mandatory class members’ interests are so closely
aligned that opting out would be illogical.51 When monetary damages are
implicated in a class action, due process demands additional protections for
absent class members.52 Thus, damages classes certified under Rule
23(b)(3) must comply with the opt-out notice requirement set forth in
23(c)(2).53 Members who opt out of the class preserve their right to pursue
their claim individually, whether or not the class action succeeds.54 However, members who opt out also lose the benefit of any monetary award
(E.D.N.Y. 2013); In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1121 (8th Cir. 2005); Meyer v. Portfolio
Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2361 (2013).
44. Classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3) have been called “damages classes” because they are
commonly used to pursue monetary damages. See Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 492; Charron, 269 F.R.D.
221; Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011); Pierce v. Co. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190
(9th Cir. 2008).
45. See Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) (noting the risk of “incompatible standards” and judgments that
“would be dispositive of the rights of others”); Fed. R. Civ. P 23(b)(1) (same).
46. Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
47. Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
48. William Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:1 (5th ed., West 2014).
49. Id.
50. Id. at § 9:1.
51. Id. at § 4:1.
52. Phillips, 472 U.S. at 812 (requiring opt-out notice for absent class members to satisfy minimum
due process).
53. Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 490 (McKinnon, J., dissenting) (citing Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558–2559).
54. Rubenstein, supra n. 48, at § 9:39.
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won by the class.55 At a court’s discretion, the 23(c)(2) notice can be ordered for prejudice and injunctive classes.56
Besides its place in the pantheon of Rule 23(a) analysis, Wal-Mart also
underscores the minimum due process required when monetary damages
are mixed into a mandatory class.57 The district court in Wal-Mart applied
the Ninth Circuit’s rule for monetary damages in injunctive classes, which
requires that monetary damages do not become the predominant relief.58
The district court found the requested injunction would provide substantial
relief in the long-term and outweigh the requested compensatory and punitive damages.59 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to have the
district court analyze if the punitive damages award predominated.60 With
its reversal of the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court cast doubt on the
propriety of any monetary damages in an injunctive class but declined to
broadly declare monetary damages beyond the reach of injunctive classes.61
Instead, the Court addressed a narrower issue, unanimously holding that
individualized damages are not appropriate in injunctive classes.62
C. Policies Behind Rule 23
The detailed requirements of Rule 23 speak to its competing policy
objectives.63 First, a class action lawsuit makes factually and legally similar
claims viable in the aggregate, even though individually they may not be
marketable.64 To the extent class actions provide a degree of judicial effi55. Id.
56. Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
57. See Megan E. Barriger, Student Author, Due Process Limitations on Rule 23(b)(2) Monetary
Remedies: Examining the Source of the Limitation in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 15 U. Pa. J. Const.
L. 619, 641–642 (2012).
58. King, supra n. 9, at 263.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 266 (citing Dukes, 603 F.3d at 622).
61. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560 (“We need not decide in this case whether there are any forms of
‘incidental’ monetary relief that are consistent with the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) we have announced and that comply with the Due Process Clause. Respondents do not argue that they can satisfy
this standard, and in any event they cannot.”).
62. Id. at 2559–2561 (“[B]ecause the necessity of that litigation [to raise individual defenses] will
prevent backpay from being ‘incidental’ to the classwide injunction, respondents’ class could not be
certified even assuming, arguendo, that ‘incidental’ monetary relief can be awarded to a 23(b)(2)
class.”); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting); King,
supra n. 9, at 290–291.
63. The dissent in Allison identifies five distinct policies served by class actions. 151 F.3d at
427–428. This case note distills the policies underlying class actions into two categories: judicial efficiency and due process. Competition between these policies arises when both sides of a class action
raise arguments that purport to advance the policies.
64. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 (“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to
overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a
solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively
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ciency, the collective action is practicable. Second, the specific requirements of class certification under Rule 23 provide due process safeguards,
which are particularly valuable considering how often certification itself encourages settlement.65 As explained below, these policies surfaced in the
arguments on both sides of Jacobsen II, but the majority’s opinion failed to
advance either judicial efficiency or due process.
III. FACTUAL

AND

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Jacobsen I
In the early 1990s, Allstate hired the consulting firm McKinsey to help
stem increasing total payouts on claims.66 McKinsey developed a set of
procedures and guidelines designed to increase the number of claims settled
with claimants who did not have legal representation while “holding the
line” on claims settled with lawyers involved.67 McKinsey found failing to
promptly and effectively communicate with claimants made them more
likely to hire lawyers, and claimants with lawyers typically settle claims for
two to three times more than unrepresented claimants.68 Thus, Allstate
could reduce total payouts by focusing on quick claimant contact and claim
resolution.69 The result of McKinsey’s analysis was a “zero sum” economic
game wherein Allstate gained when claimants lost.70 Allstate implemented
McKinsey’s recommendations with the Claim Core Process Redesign
(CCPR).71
Specifically, the CCPR created a fast-track processing system for certain claims, a “9-step process” for unrepresented claimant contact, and an
“attorney economics script” that adjusters read when they contacted claimants.72 A “Fast Track Evaluation Worksheet” determined whether a claim
could be fast-tracked, and one of the fast-track qualifications was that the
claimant be unrepresented.73 The attorney economics script advised claimpaltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.” (quoting
Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))); Spencer, supra n. 27, at 441.
65. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97,
99 (2009). Even in a class action limited to a single issue under Rule 23(c), settlement is likely to follow
certification. In re Chiang, 385 F.3d 256, 267 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[C]ourts commonly use Rule 23(c)(4) to
certify some elements of liability for class determination, while leaving other elements to individual
adjudication—or, perhaps more realistically, settlement.”).
66. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 457.
67. Id. at 457–458.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 458.
71. Jacobsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 215 P.3d 649, 653 (Mont. 2009) (Jacobsen I).
72. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 458–459.
73. Id. at 458.
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ants that an attorney could take between 25–40% of their settlement plus
any expenses incurred by the attorney.74 The script also advised that claimants who settled directly with Allstate would receive the full settlement
amount.75 The script warned adjusters about specifically dissuading claimants from hiring an attorney and instructed adjusters to remind claimants
they could retain counsel at any time.76 However, the script did not mention
that represented claimants typically secured larger settlements.77
In 2001, Robert Jacobsen suffered bodily injuries and property damage
in an auto accident with an Allstate insured.78 Six days after the accident, he
signed a written release and settled his third-party claim with Allstate for
$3,500 and 45 days of medical care.79 Allstate’s adjuster applied the CCPR
when processing Jacobsen’s claim, and quickly settled with Jacobsen,
before he retained legal counsel.80 Nearly one month later, Jacobsen experienced new shoulder pain while mowing his lawn, prompting him to ask
Allstate to rescind the release.81 When Allstate refused, Jacobsen retained
counsel.82 In an about-face that belied the CCPR’s message to consumers,
Allstate rescinded the release and reached a new settlement with Jacobsen
for approximately $200,000.83
After securing the second settlement, Jacobsen retained new counsel
and filed a complaint against Allstate, which alleged violations of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act84 (UTPA), common law bad faith, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.85 Jacobsen sought
compensatory damages for his attorney’s fees in the underlying claim and
punitive damages for Allstate’s allegedly malicious conduct.86 After the
close of discovery, Jacobsen learned of certain documents detailing Allstate’s CCPR, known as the “McKinsey documents,” which were not produced during discovery.87 Jacobsen then sought leave to amend his complaint, add class action claims, and conduct additional discovery.88 The district court denied Jacobsen’s request, and found he failed to show due
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
(1) and
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 458–459.
Jacobsen I, 215 P.3d at 653.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 654.
Id.
Id.
Mont. Code Ann. § 33–18–242 (2013). Specifically, Jacobsen alleged violations of subsections
(6).
Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 455.
Id.
Jacobsen I, 215 P.3d at 661.
Id.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2015

9

Montana Law Review, Vol. 76 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 9
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON102.txt

166

unknown

Seq: 10

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

25-MAR-15

14:02

Vol. 76

diligence or excusable neglect for failing to timely discover the McKinsey
documents.89 Jacobsen and Allstate proceeded to trial on the original complaint, and the jury found Allstate had violated the UTPA with actual malice, awarding Jacobsen more than $68,000 in compensatory damages and
$350,000 in punitive damages.90 Both Allstate and Jacobsen appealed.91
The Montana Supreme Court found the district court erred and remanded
the case for a new trial and directed the district court to compel production
of the McKinsey documents.92
B. Jacobsen II
Armed with the McKinsey documents and a new trial, Jacobsen
amended his complaint to include class action claims alleging Allstate
harmed “all unrepresented individuals who had either third-party claims or
first-party claims against Allstate” that were adjusted in Montana with the
CCPR.93 Specifically, Jacobsen alleged Allstate’s use of the CCPR violated
the UTPA by intentionally misrepresenting that claimants without attorneys
generally receive more compensation than claimants with attorneys.94 Jacobsen also alleged that the fast-track system was inadequate and resulted
in unfair settlements.95
Applying the strict commonality standard found in Wal-Mart, which
requires a common contention that is resolvable across the whole class, the
district court defined the class claim96 with three common contentions.97
First, Allstate’s use of the CCPR was a common pattern and practice in
violation of the UTPA.98 Second, the CCPR “caused indivisible harm to the
89. Id. at 661–662.
90. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 455.
91. Jacobsen I, 215 P.3d at 655. Allstate argued the district court erred by: (1) allowing the attorney
fees and costs from the settlement of the underlying insurance claim to be recoverable as damages; (2)
allowing Jacobsen’s testimony regarding Allstate’s refusal to pay Jacobsen’s “advance pay” lost wages
and denying Allstate’s lost wages jury instruction; (3) concluding there was sufficient evidence of actual
malice to support punitive damages; (4) misstating the law in the jury instructions and jury verdict form;
and (5) granting Jacobsen’s motion to exclude evidence of the legal effect of the release and denying
Allstate’s jury instruction regarding the release. In his cross-appeal, Jacobsen argued the district court
erred by: (1) denying his motion to compel production of the McKinsey documents, and (2) ruling that
Jacobsen had to prove serious or severe emotional distress to recover emotional damages in his bad faith
claim.
92. Id. at 664.
93. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 456.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Rule 23 requires a court certifying a class action to define the class claims, issues, and defenses
in its certifying order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
97. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 456–457.
98. Id. at 456.
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class as a whole” through its “zero-sum economic theory.”99 Third, Allstate
acted with actual malice by implementing the CCPR, which resulted in
smaller settlements for class members than what was previously sufficient
to fully and fairly settle their claims.100 The district court also narrowed the
definition of the class.101 Specifically, class members were required to be
unrepresented claimants who filed first-party or third-party claims with Allstate.102 The claims had to be related to an underlying motor vehicle incident and in excess of the policy deductible.103 Finally, the class only extended to claims adjusted in Montana with the CCPR.104
Allstate appealed the class certification105 and the court’s consideration of evidence that was not in a “trial-admissible form” during its class
certification analysis.106 The Montana Supreme Court addressed Allstate’s
arguments as three issues, two of which turned on an analysis of class certification under Rule 23.107 First, the Court addressed whether the district
court abused its discretion in finding the putative class met the requirements
of Rule 23(a).108 Second, the Court examined whether the class was properly certified under Rule 23(b)(2).109 The details of these two holdings are
explored in the following section of this note.
IV. THE MAJORITY

AND

DISSENTING OPINIONS

A. The Majority’s Opinion
1. Rule 23(a)
Justice Wheat began the majority opinion’s Rule 23 analysis with a
review of the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy.110 Because Allstate did not challenge
Jacobsen’s estimates tallying around 600 third-party claimants alone, the
99. Id.
100. Id. at 456–457.
101. Id. at 457.
102. Id.
103. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 457.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 476–479 (Regarding Allstate’s evidentiary appeal, which is not the focus of this note, the
Court held that the Montana Rules of Evidence do not apply to information reviewed for Rule 23
analysis.).
107. Id. at 454.
108. Id. at 459–471.
109. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 471–476.
110. Id. at 459–472.
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Court accepted that numerosity was met and focused its attention on the
remaining three requirements.111
a. Commonality
The permissive standard for Rule 23(a)(2) requires questions of law or
fact common to the class,112 which the Court noted was traditionally a “relatively low burden for plaintiffs.”113 The Court also acknowledged Montana’s “long history of relying on federal jurisprudence” to interpret the
requirements of Rule 23—jurisprudence that was tightened by Wal-Mart.114
Specifically, the Court recognized the Wal-Mart standard materially differs
from the permissive standard by requiring the class to be united not just by
any question of law or fact, but by one that drives resolution of the claim
with its answer.115
Nonetheless, the Court declined to formally resolve whether Wal-Mart
is the new standard in Montana.116 The district court had applied the WalMart standard, and both Jacobsen and Allstate had briefed the Court with
Wal-Mart-styled arguments.117 Without the parties thoroughly briefing the
differences between the permissive and rigorous standards, the Court noted
it was ill-prepared to make a formal, final decision on the proper standard.118 Instead, the Court decided to wait for a case where the choice of
standard would be dispositive.119
In applying the Wal-Mart standard, Justice Wheat distinguished Jacobsen’s claim from the claim made in Wal-Mart.120 While the Wal-Mart
plaintiffs could not prove the existence of a company-wide policy that explained why each class member was harmed, Jacobsen could reasonably
show the CCPR caused objectionable settlements for each individual class
member. Thus, litigating the lawfulness of the CCPR in a class action
would resolve a common issue at the heart of each member’s claim, and the
Jacobsen II class passed the Wal-Mart commonality test.121
111. Id. at 460.
112. Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
113. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 460 (citing Diaz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 267 P.3d 756, 763
(Mont. 2011)).
114. Id. at 460–461 (citing Chipman v. N.W. Healthcare Corp., 288 P.3d 193, 206–207 (Mont.
2012)).
115. King, supra n. 9, at 281.
116. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 461.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Mattson, 291 P.3d at 1220–1221).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 462–463.
121. Id. at 463.
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b. Typicality
The Court also rejected Allstate’s arguments against typicality.122 Rule
23(a)(3) states the representative party must have claims or defenses that
are typical of the class.123 As Allstate pointed out, Jacobsen’s CCPR-adjusted settlement was rescinded prior to the lawsuit, unlike the rest of the
putative class members’.124 However, the Court found the specific facts of
Jacobsen’s case did not prohibit typicality, and held typicality does not
speak to an individual plaintiff’s circumstances, but instead to the common
legal theory shared across the class.125 Following McDonald, the Court reiterated that a claim is typical if it “stems from the same event, practice, or
course of conduct that forms the basis of the class claims and is based upon
the same legal theory or remedial theory.”126 Because all putative class
members’ claims, including Jacobsen’s claim, arose from the use of the
CCPR, Jacobsen’s legal theory was sufficiently typical of the class.
c. Adequacy
Finally, the Court dismissed Allstate’s adequacy arguments.127 The
fourth prerequisite of Rule 23(a) requires that the representative party be
able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.128 Allstate
argued Jacobsen’s prior rescinded settlement raised unique defenses that did
not apply to the rest of the class.129 However, the Court held Jacobsen’s
interests need not perfectly reflect those of all class members under Rule
23(a)(4).130 Only conflicts of interest that are “so substantial as to overbalance the common interests of the class members as a whole” would disqualify Jacobsen, and no such conflicts were present.131
2. Rule 23(b)
The Court’s second step of certification review considered whether the
district court abused its discretion by certifying the class under Rule
23(b)(2). As previously noted, Rule 23(b)(2) allows the court to certify a
class action if “final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief” is
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 470.
Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 469.
Id. at 469–470 (citing Chipman, 288 P.3d at 209).
Id. at 470 (quoting McDonald, 862 P.2d at 1156).
Id. at 471.
Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 470.
Id. (citing Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 138 (1st Cir. 2012)).
Id. (quoting Matamoros, 699 F.3d at 138).
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an appropriate remedy for the whole class.132 The emphasis on injunctive
and declaratory relief does not necessarily exclude monetary relief, but it
does establish, at a minimum, that no other form of relief can outweigh the
injunction or declaration.133
Because the balance of remedies provided by the injunctive class is
essential to the Rule, the Court in Jacobsen II first reviewed the four forms
of relief certified by the district court.134 If the trial ended with judgment for
the class, only the four remedies certified by the court would be available.
The first possible remedy was a declaration of the CCPR’s unlawfulness.135
A declaration of unlawfulness would lead to the second possible remedy, an
injunction that required Allstate to give class members an opportunity to
have their claims readjusted.136 Class-wide punitive damages were the third
possible remedy, pending a finding of actual malice in Allstate’s conduct.137 If class-wide punitive damages were awarded, a common fund for
payment of attorney’s fees would be the fourth and final remedy.138
The Jacobsen II Court reversed the certification of class-wide punitive
damages because Allstate had a due process right to raise individualized
defenses.139 The Court recognized each member’s damages would be
uniquely tied to his or her underlying claim.140 As a result, the Court expressed concern that a class-wide punitive damages award could reach
“non-injured parties.”141 But rather than bar punitive damages entirely, the
Court determined it would be best to resolve the common, threshold issue
of the CCPR’s lawfulness in one class action and let each member seek
individual damages, both compensatory and punitive, in separate trials.142
The Court relied heavily on the federal McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch
case to restructure the class to decide only a single element of the class
members’ claims.143 The factual basis for McReynolds focused on alleged
132. Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
133. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559 (“Rule 23(b)(2) ‘does not extend to cases in which the appropriate
final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages.’ ” (emphasis in original) (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory comm. nn. (1966 amend. to subdiv. (b)(2)))).
134. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 471–472.
135. Id. at 471.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 475 (holding “Allstate should be able to establish defenses to individual claims to ensure
that punitive damages are not awarded to claimants that were not actually damaged by the adjustment of
their claims under the CCPR.”).
140. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 475–476.
141. Id. at 476.
142. Id. at 464–465 (citing McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d
482 (7th Cir. 2012)).
143. Id. at 464–466 (citing McReynolds, 672 F.3d 482).
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racial discrimination in Merrill Lynch’s employment policies.144 Class
members sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive
relief for Merrill Lynch’s continued use of the policies.145 To be eligible for
this variety of remedies, the putative class requested both certification as an
injunctive class and issue certification under Rule 23(c)(4).146 On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit held certification was appropriate under both provisions
of Rule 23, and remanded the matter to the district court.147 In dicta, Judge
Richard Allen Posner’s opinion explained that hundreds of individual suits
could assign monetary damages at the conclusion of an injunctive class.148
Because the Jacobsen II class was set to conclude without awarding
class-wide damages, the Court revised the second class claim and removed
any mention of an “indivisible harm” the CCPR caused to the entire
class.149 The rewritten second class claim alleged Allstate’s CCPR simply
“resulted in damages to the members of the class.”150 If the class prevailed,
the Court’s revision required class members to bring individual claims in
hundreds of separate trials to determine individual damages.151 Allstate argued the revised claim did not provide “final” relief within the meaning of
Rule 23(b)(2) because it clearly envisioned hundreds of additional trials to
finally resolve each class member’s claim.152 The Court brushed aside Allstate’s objection and concluded the word “final” did not “impose a substantive obligation” to conclusively resolve all members’ claims in a single
class action.153 With the damages component to be determined in subsequent trials, the remedial balance of the class trial did not predominantly
favor monetary damages, and the class could be certified under Rule
23(b)(2).154
In sum, the Court held the Jacobsen II class, after some retooling, satisfied all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and the remedial restrictions of
23(b).155 The key to balancing the remedies under Rule 23(b)(2) was to
push monetary damages into hundreds of subsequent trials where each
144. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 483.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) (“[W]hen appropriate, an action may be . . . maintained as
a class action with respect to particular issues.”)); see also Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) (using a minor
difference in wording).
147. Id. at 492.
148. Id.
149. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 467.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 465.
152. Id. at 473.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 475.
155. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 460–471, 479.
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member alone would seek to prove damages.156 With this procedural plan
in place, the Court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.157
B. Baker’s Dissent
Justice Baker’s dissent, which Justice Rice joined, raised two primary
concerns with the majority opinion. First, Justice Baker pointed out the continued confusion that would result from the Court’s refusal to reach a definitive position on the applicability of Wal-Mart commonality in Montana.158
Second, she criticized the majority for ignoring the plain language of Rule
23(b)(2).159
Regarding commonality, Justice Baker disagreed with the premise that
fully briefing the matter was necessary to decide which legal standard
should apply in Montana.160 From Justice Baker’s perspective, the proper
standard should not even be a point of contention.161 Montana had traditionally followed in the path of the federal interpretation of Rule 23, and no
party had argued for Montana to depart from that path.162
Regarding Rule 23(b)(2), Justice Baker directed the Court’s attention
to the 1966 Advisory Committee notes to the Federal Rules.163 The Advisory Notes indicate that class actions designed to lay the foundation for
damages are the “the province of Rule 23(b)(3).”164 Thus, the “final injunctive relief”165 contemplated in Rule 23(b)(2) proscribes certifying injunctive
classes when monetary damages are the ultimate remedy.166 Because the
restructured Jacobsen II class action is just the first of hundreds of trials
needed to resolve the plaintiffs’ claims, the class action failed to provide a
156. Id. at 475 (because the potential class-wide punitive damages were reversed, there was no need
to address whether monetary damages were appropriate in an injunctive class).
157. Id. at 479.
158. Id. at 479–480 (Baker & Rice, JJ., dissenting).
159. Id. at 480–482.
160. Id. at 479.
161. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 479 (“By perpetuating confusion over whether Wal-Mart changed the
law—a point I do not believe is reasonably open to dispute—the Court disserves prospective class
plaintiffs and defendants . . . .”).
162. Id. at 480.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 481 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory comm. nn. (1966 amend. to subdiv. (b)(2))).
165. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
166. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 481 (Baker & Rice, JJ., dissenting) (citing Richards v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 453 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 499 (7th Cir.
2012); Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 979 (5th Cir. 2000); DWFII Corp. v. St. Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 676, 685 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Cholakyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 281
F.R.D. 534, 561 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Mogel v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 646 F. Supp. 2d 177, 184 (D.
Mass. 2009)).
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final resolution.167 While certification as a damages class may have been
appropriate, Justice Baker noted the Jacobsen II class failed to preserve and
develop its fallback argument for certification under Rule 23(b)(3).168 Because the opportunity to consider certification as a damages class had
passed, Justice Baker argued the Court’s only option was to decline certification.169
C. McKinnon’s Dissent
Justice McKinnon agreed the Court correctly barred class-wide punitive damages, but found little common ground with the rest of the majority
opinion.170 Like Justice Baker, Justice McKinnon expressed frustration with
the Court’s unwillingness to adopt the Wal-Mart standard outright.171 Justice McKinnon, however, dedicated most of her dissent to Rule 23(b) and
the rewritten class claim, which was the heart of the majority’s analysis.172
Justice McKinnon believed the district court constructed the class
claim to “minimally” satisfy the criteria of Rule 23(b)(2).173 Justice McKinnon stressed that the district court’s decision did not certify a blanket UTPA
action, but instead a claim that the CCPR was per se unlawful under the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.174 To Justice McKinnon, the “indivisible harm” the district court referred to was not the sum of hundreds of
separate UTPA claims, but a single harm caused by the allegedly unlawful
CCPR.175 Thus, the revision to the second claim fundamentally altered the
action.176 Jacobsen’s original class claim sought a declaration of the
CCPR’s unlawfulness, injunctive relief, and incidental, class-wide damages,
but the majority’s reconstruction of the claim reduced the declaratory and
injunctive relief to a mere predicate for individualized monetary damages.177 By Justice McKinnon’s analysis, the claim could no longer be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) following Wal-Mart, which held that individualized damages are never appropriate in an injunctive class.178 Moreover, the
majority’s affirmation of the class action jeopardized the class members’
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 480–481.
Id. at 481–482.
Id.
Id. at 483 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
Id. at 493.
Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 482–493.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 486–487 (citing Mont. Code Ann. tit. 27, ch. 8).
Id. at 487–488.
Id. at 487.
Id.
Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 491 (citing Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559).
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due process rights by letting the action proceed without the notice and optout protections of Rule 23(b)(3).179
V. AN ANALYSIS

OF THE

JACOBSEN II HOLDING

A. Wal-Mart Commonality and Rule 23(a)
Absent a constitutional basis, the change in federal precedent regarding the federal rules of civil procedure creates no obligation for states to
follow suit, despite any similarity between the federal and state rule.180
However, the Montana Supreme Court has made its general reliance on
federal precedent for Rule 23 abundantly clear.181 When adopting the permissive standard for commonality in McDonald, the Court did not labor
over its implications.182 The Court’s broad statement in Chipman v. Northwest Healthcare Corp. about relying on federal precedent, while not a fullthroated embrace of Wal-Mart, shows at least a preference for it.183 The
sentiment, however, did not last. The Court reopened the question of WalMart commonality in Mattson v. Montana Power Co. and saved the choice
of “permissive” versus “stringent” standards for a later case.184 By the time
Jacobsen II reached the Court, reliance had turned into suspicion about
“march[ing] lockstep with federal interpretations” of Rule 23.185 Even after
Jacobsen II, the Court has refused to take a firm position on Wal-Mart
commonality.186 While the Court’s decision to distance itself from pure reliance on federal precedent is reasonable, its continued failure to resolve
ambiguity about the proper standard is increasingly unreasonable.
In the Court’s defense, the decision is not one to be made lightly. On
one hand, defense attorneys across the nation are enthusiastic about stricter
179. Id. at 490–493.
180. Brilz v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 285 P.3d 494, 500 (Mont. 2012) (noting how most states have
chosen not to follow the federal precedent for Rule 8(a) set in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009), and Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–555 (2007)).
181. Sieglock v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry., 81 P.3d 495, 497 (Mont. 2003) (observing “federal
authority is instructive on the issue of class certification”).
182. King, supra n. 9, at 280, 283 (Montana adopted the permissive approach simply because it was
the prevailing test).
183. Chipman, 288 P.3d at 208 (“Following this Court’s long history of relying on federal jurisprudence when interpreting the class certification requirements of Rule 23, we apply the Wal-Mart reasoning to the present case.”).
184. Mattson, 291 P.3d at 1220 (“The question arises as to whether Montana, which in the past has
followed the lead of federal courts in class-certification analysis, should abandon its ‘permissive’ approach to Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement in favor of the Wal-Mart majority’s more stringent
standard.”).
185. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 459.
186. Sangwin, 315 P.3d at 284–285 (“Though the District Court relied upon the standard Montana
followed prior to Wal-Mart, this requirement is met even under Wal-Mart’s more stringent standard.”).
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standards for class certification.187 They are rightly leery of frivolous suits
snowballing into costly class actions.188 On the other hand, plaintiffs are
concerned over a pattern in recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions: an incremental closing of the courthouse doors to class claims.189 Both positions
have merit, and neither is served by the persistent ambiguity surrounding
commonality in Montana. From either point of view, the Court’s current
plan of action—waiting in a holding pattern until it happens across a case
that turns on the choice of standards190—leaves potential class action litigants in the dark.
The choice of standards should be informed by policies promoted by
Rule 23 and class actions generally.191 Those policies compete in every
class action brought before the Court, even if the parties argue for the same
standard. Plaintiffs appeal to judicial efficiency through the consolidation of
hundreds of potential trials. Similarly, judicial efficiency motivates defendants’ arguments about the immense cost and time commitment sunk into
187. Catherine R. Hecker, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes: Taming “Too Big to Fail” Classes in the
Battle Against Blackmail Actions and Frivolous Litigation, 7 Liberty U. L. Rev. 49, 86 (2012) (concluding Wal-Mart “is a precedent that successfully tames ‘too big to fail’ classes aimed at blackmailing
defendants with deep pockets,” but does not stop “meritorious classes”); Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court
Dumps Wal-Mart Sex-Discrimination Class Action, Forbes, http://perma.cc/SGH6-8RLD (http://
www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/06/20/supreme-court-dumps-wal-mart-sex-discriminationclass-action/) (June 20, 2011).
188. For a particularly vituperative characterization of the defendant’s point of view, see Eric D.
Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We’ll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 into the
Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1773, 1775 (1997) (“[F]rom the defendants’ perspective, class
actions are the ultimate weapon of legal terrorism, launched by litigation-mad, bottom-feeding, moneyhungry, professional plaintiffs’ lawyers.”).
189. Spencer, supra n. 27, at 448 (“Dukes’s heightened commonality standard is also disquieting in
light of the Court’s other recent decisions trending in the direction of restricting access to justice.”);
Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 729, 733 (2013) (“With many
more class actions in federal court, and with more class certification decisions being reviewed by appellate courts, federal courts have created new hurdles for plaintiffs seeking class certification.”); Deborah
M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 Yale J.L. & Feminism 119, 121 (2012) (“The
Court’s denial of class certification [in Wal-Mart] has been viewed by many commentators as a ‘major
blow to working women across America’ and a wholesale rejection by the Court of the use of discrimination law as an instrument of social change.” (quoting Courtney E. Martin, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Ruling
is Out of Sync with 21st-Century Sex Discrimination, Christian Sci. Monitor (June 22, 2011) (available
at http://perma.cc/6K5A-N6NX (http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0622/Wal-Mart
-v.-Dukes-ruling-is-out-of-sync-with-21st-century-sex-discrimination)))).
190. Mattson, 291 P.3d at 1220–1221 (“It may be necessary in a future case—where the issue is
properly briefed and argued, and the choice of one standard over the other is dispositive of the commonality inquiry—to decide whether Montana will retain its more permissive approach or instead adopt the
Wal-Mart majority’s approach.”).
191. The notion that policy should drive the fair application of Rule 23 is not new. Nearly forty years
ago, a Third Circuit panel chose to set aside precedent with complicated procedural history and instead
assessed a question of notice in a (b)(2) class with “the policies underlying the constitutional requirement of due process.” Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256 (3d Cir. 1975); see Allison, 151
F.3d at 428 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“Rule 23’s requirements for class action suits should be interpreted
in light of the basic purposes of the rule.”).
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class actions. Due process surfaces both as the plea of class members whose
claims could not otherwise be heard192 and the protest of defendants whose
individualized defenses are swallowed by the sheer size of the class.193 The
facts of any given case color these policy arguments, and it is reasonable for
the Court to want to wait until it can see the bigger picture of policy tradeoffs encompassed in a particular standard. However, a just standard ultimately survives on the policies that merit its continued use, not the facts
from which it sprang. The perceived frivolity of a class action or reprehensibility of a defendant’s acts should not influence the impartial rule that is
applied to every future certification question. As Nabokov poetically observed, “the breaking of a wave cannot explain the whole sea.”194 Beyond
Wal-Mart and Jacobsen II is a complicated, conflicted world that will inevitably spawn more class actions. The appropriate standard for evaluating
those future classes stems from policy, and the Court has heard plenty of
cases to be fully able to weigh the policy trade-offs of the Wal-Mart standard.
A fair assessment of Rule 23’s policy goals arrives at Wal-Mart’s more
rigorous commonality standard. As evidenced by the Montana Supreme
Court’s history of siding with a class when its commonality was at issue,195
the permissive standard heavily favors class certification. In Diaz v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Montana, the Court’s elaboration of the commonality
requirement boiled down to two statements: first, a single common issue
will suffice, and second, “commonality is not a ‘stringent threshold.”’ 196 As
Justice Scalia observed in Wal-Mart, any competently written class complaint can meet the permissive standard.197 Broad interpretation of commonality under the permissive standard effectively renders the prerequisite
192. Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 256 (“The due process problem surfaces because the class action judgment
binds all members of a (b)(2) class.”).
193. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) (“A defendant in a class action has a
due process right to raise individual challenges and defenses to claims, and a class action cannot be
certified in a way that eviscerates this right or masks individual issues.”). The Cato Institute’s amicus
brief in Jacobsen II discusses both the due process rights of absent class members and of defendants
who lose the ability to raise individualized defenses. Amicus Curiae Br. of the Cato Inst. & Ctr. for
Class Action Fairness in Support of Petrs., Jacobsen II, 2014 WL 847538 at *3 (No. 13-916, 134 S.Ct.
2135 (2014)) (“The Montana Supreme Court’s mechanism deprives defendants of their ability to raise
individual defenses to the plaintiffs’ claims.”).
194. Nabokov, supra n. 1, at 105.
195. Diaz, 267 P.3d at 764; McDonald, 862 P.2d at 1155; Sieglock, 81 P.3d at 499; Ferguson v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 180 P.3d 1164, 1170 (Mont. 2008); Chipman, 288 P.3d at 208; Mattson, 291
P.3d at 1219–1220; Jacobsen, 310 P.3d at 468; Sangwin, 315 P.3d at 285.
196. 267 P.3d at 763 (quoting Ferguson, 180 P.3d at 1169).
197. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550–2551 (the language of Rule 23(a)(2) “is easy to misread, since
‘[a]ny competently crafted class complaint literally raises common questions.’ ” (quoting Nagareda,
supra n. 65, at 131–132)).
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meaningless. When the prerequisites of Rule 23 are reduced to trivialities,
they cease to promote judicial efficiency and due process.
A more rigorous requirement of a “single common question” that is
“capable of classwide resolution”198 is not an insurmountable obstacle.199
For example, the district court in Sangwin applied the permissive standard
of commonality and concluded the prerequisite was satisfied.200 On appeal,
the Montana Supreme Court went out of its way to find the Wal-Mart standard satisfied, even though neither party argued the issue.201 Despite its
characterization of Wal-Mart as a “significant” tightening of commonality,202 the Court has yet to find a case that fails to meet the Wal-Mart standard.203 The heightened commonality standard of Wal-Mart will not foreclose all future class actions, but it will elevate commonality to more than a
perfunctory step on the road to certification. The Montana Supreme Court
should adopt the Wal-Mart standard as a reasonable hurdle for legitimate
classes and a needed due process protection for class opponents.
B. Due Process Protection in Injunctive Classes
While the Court’s failure to take a position on the Wal-Mart commonality standard is significant, the more troubling result of Jacobsen II is the
dismantling of due process for injunctive classes. The Court undermined
due process in two ways. First, the Court’s restructured class claim serves
as a springboard for individualized damages in opposition to long-standing
precedent. Second, by allowing monetary damages to follow the injunctive
class, the Court made no effort to incorporate Rule 23’s optional notice and
opt-out provisions.
1. Individualized Damages
In an injunctive class action, “the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”204 Class cohesiveness with respect to relief is not
198. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551, 2556 (“[F]or purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) even a single common
question will do . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
199. Andrey Spektor, The Death Knell of Issue Certification and Why that Matters after Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, 26 St. Thomas L. Rev. 165, 170 (2014) (“Early returns on Dukes, however, show that in practice
the commonality requirement is largely unaffected. Diligent class counsel have been careful to isolate
concrete common policies for certification, and lower courts have, for the most part, read Dukes narrowly, as a bar to certifying policies that do no more than delegate discretion.”).
200. 315 P.3d at 285.
201. Id. at 284–285.
202. Id. at 284.
203. See e.g. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 468; Mattson, 291 P.3d at 1221; Chipman, 288 P.3d at 208.
204. Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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just a suggestion, but an essential characteristic of an injunctive class.205
While neither the plain language of the rule nor precedent explicitly bars
monetary relief for an injunctive class,206 the Federal Advisory Committee’s notes and a long line of caselaw make clear that monetary relief cannot be the predominant remedy.207 Courts have read into this predominance
requirement a license for incidental damages.208 While the appropriateness
of incidental damages is doubtful following Wal-Mart,209 even a liberal interpretation of “incidental” has limitations.210 Incidental damages are
mechanical calculations,211 devoid of individualized facts and circumstances.212 This remedial limitation stems from due process concerns.213 As
205. The homogeneity of (b)(2) classes justifies their lack of due process protections relative to
(b)(3) classes. Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 253 (“[T]he procedural protections of (b)(3), opting out and notice,
are necessary because of the heterogeneity of the (b)(3) class. They are unnecessary for the homogeneous (b)(2) class.”).
206. The U.S. Supreme Court’s silence on the propriety of monetary damages in (b)(2) classes could
be read as either an invitation or a prohibition. Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions at the Crossroads:
An Answer to Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 5 Harv. L. & Policy Rev. 375, 380 (2011) (“Given that the Supreme
Court has at different times interpreted silence to allow for and foreclose a particular remedy, Rule
23(b)(2) is open to either interpretation.”).
207. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory comm. nn. (1966 amend. to subdiv. (b)(2)) (“The subdivision does
not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money
damages.”); Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 480 (Baker & Rice, JJ., dissenting); Holmes v. Contl. Can Co., 706
F.2d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding monetary damages are inappropriate in (b)(2) injunctive
classes).
208. Allison, 151 F.3d at 415 (concluding that “monetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class actions
unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief.”). The dissent in Allison suggested
that weighing the relative predominance of monetary relief required both quantitative and qualitative
factors. Id. at 429 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (suggesting “the committee may have meant for the court to
compare the quantity and quality of the injunctive and monetary remedies in the particular case to see
which was predominant.”).
209. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (noting “serious doubt about whether claims for monetary relief
may be certified under” (b)(2)) (citing Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994)). The district
court’s order in Jacobsen II found no serious doubt in the Ticor decision. Or. In re Misc. Remand Mots.
Challenging 4th Amend. Compl. & Or. Certifying Rule 23(b)(2) Class Action, Jacobsen II, No. ADV03-201(d), slip or. at n. 50 (Mont. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2012) (available from court & on file with
author). Regardless, the Wal-Mart opinion expresses those doubts. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
210. Allison, 151 F.3d at 415 (“[T]he recovery of incidental damages should typically be concomitant with, not merely consequential to, class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief. Moreover, such damages should at least be capable of computation by means of objective standards and not dependent in any
significant way on the intangible, subjective differences of each class member’s circumstances.”).
211. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 491 (McKinnon, J., dissenting) (noting that incidental “means ‘requiring only a mechanical computation’ ” (quoting Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 637 F.3d 818, 825 (7th
Cir. 2011)); Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Employee Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364, 372 (7th Cir. 2012)
(concluding “mechanical, formulaic” monetary relief does not require additional due process safeguards); Berger v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guar. Plan, 338 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding
monetary damages “followed mechanically” and were an “anticipated consequence of the declaration”
in a (b)(2) class)).
212. Allison, 151 F.3d at 415 (“Liability for incidental damages should not require additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual’s case; it should neither introduce new and substantial legal or factual issues, nor entail complex individualized determinations.”); Lemon v. Loc. No.
139, 216 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2000).
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previously noted, mandatory class actions can bind absent class members
who might otherwise pursue individual claims, which effectively deprives
them of property in the form of a legal claim.214 Damages classes certified
under Rule 23(b)(3) assuage these concerns by further filtering classes at
the point of certification and giving absent class members an opportunity to
preserve individual claims by opting out of the class.215 In an injunctive
class, however, the limitation on remedies and the adequacy requirement in
Rule 23(a)(4) are the only elements of Rule 23 tailored to protect due process.216
When the Ninth Circuit reviewed the class certification in Wal-Mart,
the court recognized a critical due process problem: for some members of
the class, relief would be predominantly monetary.217 While current WalMart employees could benefit from injunctive relief correcting an alleged
pattern or practice of discrimination, such a remedy would mean little to
past employees.218 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit excluded from the class
all past employees, whose only remedy was an award of back pay.219 This
distinction is illustrative of the due process problem that arises from monetary damages in injunctive classes. An injunction alone would be a pyrrhic
victory for past employees. Those class members could only find relief in
back pay and punitive damages, which would require individual analysis of
each employee’s circumstances.220 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to consider a (b)(3) damages class for
past employees.221 With this narrowed application of (b)(2) as a starting
point, the U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous holding that certification as an
injunctive class was inappropriate222 is a layer of refinement on a well213. Phillips, 472 U.S. at 812 (in a case that provides predominantly monetary damages, “due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself
from the class by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ or ‘request for exclusion’ form to the court.”);
Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 117 (1994) (“In
order to bind an absent plaintiff concerning a claim for monetary damages, the court must provide
minimal due process.”).
214. Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 252–253 (noting that “the fundamental objective of (b)(2) [is] to bind the
members of the class with one conclusive adjudication”).
215. Beyond the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), a class certified under (b)(3) must also show that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods” of adjudication. Mont. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3). Combined with mandatory notice and the ability to opt-out, the predominance and superiority requirements are additional “procedural protections.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558.
216. Barriger, supra n. 57, at 622.
217. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 623–624 (noting that, for past employees, “it is difficult to say that monetary relief does not predominate.”).
218. Id. at 623.
219. The court noted that a (b)(3) class could be appropriate for past employees. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 624.
222. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
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established precedent: injunctive classes are inappropriate when monetary
damages predominate.
The circumstances of Jacobsen II were admittedly less clear-cut, but
the majority’s certification nonetheless conflicts with the established rule
limiting remedies in injunctive classes. The Court approved certification as
an injunctive class because, if the class won at trial, all members of the
class would find relief in the injunctive readjustment of their insurance
claims.223 Separate individual trials would determine if monetary relief was
justified under the facts of each claim.224 The line the Court drew between
the revised class action and the subsequent trials is thin, but it may be
enough to skirt direct conflict with the unanimous rejection of individualized damages in Wal-Mart. Nonetheless, the Court’s procedural plan clearly
conflicts with the intent of Wal-Mart, and it does so with no discernable
benefit. While the concept of a narrowly crafted class action that decides
only one issue of a larger claim is contemplated by Rule 23(c)(4),225 it
affords little judicial efficiency, and more fundamentally, little justice.226
By adding another step to each class member’s pursuit of monetary relief,
the Court ensures that the future of Jacobsen II will be hopelessly mired in
hundreds of individual trials.
The majority’s reliance on McReynolds to support this shotgun approach—where one class action sparks hundreds of trials—is misplaced. As
Justice McKinnon noted, the question of whether individualized damages
trials were appropriate was not part of the class’s appeal in McReynolds.227
Thus, Judge Posner’s pontification on the possibility of subsequent damages trials was not part of the Seventh Circuit holding.228 Even if it had
been, the marketability of the individual damages was an important factor
223. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 424–425, 472.
224. Id. at 472.
225. Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). It should be noted, however, that recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions
show an increasing animus toward issue certification. Spektor, supra n. 199, at 181 (“The interpretation
of Comcast and Amgen does not bode well for issue certification, which by definition, compartmentalizes class claims to permit class treatment of discrete issues. Neither Dukes nor Comcast discuss issue
certification, but their analyses suggest that it will come under increasing scrutiny.” (citing Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) and Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct.
1184 (2013))).
226. Spektor, supra n. 199, at 187 (“Aside from this possible gain in efficiency, holding independent
mini-trials for every individual claim seems to undercut the idea that piecemeal class actions ‘materially
advance . . . litigation.’ More likely, they incentivize settlements, but courts are in the business of
adjudicating cases, not cajoling amicable resolutions.” (quoting McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522
F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008))).
227. The issues presented in McReynolds pertained to the class’s ability to appeal the denial of
certification and the common factual backgrounds of the classes in McReynolds and Wal-Mart. Jacobsen
II, 310 P. 3d at 491 (citing McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 483).
228. Jacobsen II, 310 P. 3d at 491.
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of Judge Posner’s logic.229 In Jacobsen II, the amount of damages at stake
in the possible subsequent trials pales in comparison to the years of back
pay at issue in McReynolds.230 With less incentive to pursue the separate
trials for damages, the McReynolds approach is an impractical solution for
Jacobsen II class members. Further, Judge Posner’s “kicker” supporting individualized damages trials was a determination that “the accuracy of the
resolution would be unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings.”231
In Jacobsen II, each class member’s insurance claim relied on a unique set
of facts, and readjustment could result in a major change in the claim’s
settlement or no change at all.232 The class’s reliance on statistical evidence233 and the necessity of subsequent individual trials concede this variation. In each individual trial for damages, Allstate would be free to present
the defense that, despite a declarative judgment on CCPR’s unlawfulness,
initial settlements with the individual plaintiffs were fair and adequate. Repeated proceedings would not just enhance the accuracy of the resolution;
they would be the only way to achieve an accurate resolution. Thus, if
Judge Posner’s concept of individualized trials is precedent worth adopting,
it nonetheless fails under the facts of Jacobsen II.
2. Notice and Opt-Out Provisions
For obvious reasons, the Court’s procedural plan only becomes a due
process issue if the class wins at trial. Unfortunately, the alternative outcome presents an entirely different due process conundrum. Injunctive classes are mandatory, and as long as the class is adequately represented, the
resolution of the class trial is binding on all absent class members.234 While
Rule 23(c)(2) gives a certifying court latitude to order notice for absent
class members in mandatory classes, this protective measure is optional.235
Further, although opt-out instructions are occasionally included in the op229. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 492 (“The stakes in each of the plaintiffs’ claims are great enough to
make individual suits feasible.”).
230. Id. (“Most of Merrill Lynch’s brokers earn at least $100,000 a year, and many earn much more,
and the individual claims involve multiple years.”).
231. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 465 (quoting McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 491).
232. As Justice McKinnon put it, “the question whether Allstate’s use of the CCPR resulted in
damages to the members of the class cannot be answered on a classwide basis in any event.” Jacobsen
II, 310 P.3d at 488–489 (McKinnon, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
233. The class relied on a study from the Consumer Federation of America to show the impact of the
CCPR on claimants and Allstate’s bottom line. Appellee’s Response Br., Jacobsen II, 2012 WL
3570015 at *2–5 (Mont. Aug. 6, 2012) (No. DA12-0130).
234. Rubenstein, supra n. 48, at § 4:1.
235. Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
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tional notice sent to injunctive classes,236 the dicta of the Wal-Mart decision
suggests opt-out rights do not truly exist.237
As precedent, the Court’s approval of Jacobsen II’s mandatory class
absent the optional notice and opt-out provisions of Rule 23(c)(2) is troubling. If the Jacobsen II class is not successful at trial, individual class members could be barred from bringing independently viable claims.238 The
Court did not address the preclusive effect an adverse judgment would have
on absent class members. By not even mentioning notice and opt-out procedures, the Court’s certification implies those procedures are not necessary
to protect absent class members’ due process rights. Had the district court
already included notice and opt-out instructions for absent class members in
its certifying order, the Court’s oversight could be forgivable. The district
court’s order, however, was specifically crafted to avoid individualized
damages and the accompanying burden of notice and opt-out rights.239 As a
result, applying the Court’s interpretation of the rule for injunctive classes
would effectively “nullify” the added due process protections of damages
classes “whenever a plaintiff class, at its option, combines its monetary
claims with a request—even a ‘predominating request’—for an injunction.”240
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court should have rejected certification of the Jacobsen II class as
an injunctive class. This is not to say the Jacobsen II class members have
no viable class action, but rather they were allowed to proceed under the
wrong type of class action. In its certifying order, the district court rejected
the alternate damages class and the concept of a “hybrid” class with claims
structured under both subsections of the rule.241 On appeal, the class did not
236. Rima N. Daniels, Monetary Damages in Mandatory Classes: When Should Opt-Out Rights Be
Allowed? 57 Ala. L. Rev. 499, 505 (2005) (“Opt-out rights in the (b)(2) context have traditionally been
rare. The general rule under 23(b)(2) is that absent individual class members do not have an automatic
right to opt out of a certified class to bring their own claims, either in cases where a (b)(2) class is tried
or settled.”).
237. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (noting that Rule 23 “provides no opportunity for (b)(1) or (b)(2)
class members to opt out.”); see also Manual for Complex Litigation (4th) § 21.311 (West 2011) (“If
notice is appropriate, it need not be individual notice because, unlike a Rule 23(b)(3) class, there is no
right to request exclusion from Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes.”).
238. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 490–491 (McKinnon, J., dissenting) (“If Jacobsen loses on the merits,
then the class members’ individual claims for damages will be seriously compromised, if not totally
barred.”).
239. Or. In re Misc. Remand Mots. Challenging 4th Amend. Compl. & Or. Certifying Rule 23(b)(2)
Class Action, Jacobsen II, No. ADV-03-201(d), slip or. at 136, 142 (Mont. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 30,
2012) (available from court & on file with author).
240. Jacobsen II, 310 P.3d at 491 (McKinnon, J., dissenting) (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559).
241. Id. at 471 (majority).
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clarify or expand upon its argument for certification under (b)(3) as a damages class.242 Had Rule 23(b)(3) been before the Court, the route to certification would not have crossed the limitation on remedies for injunctive
classes or circumvented absent class members’ due process rights. The
question of the CCPR’s lawfulness would need to be developed, but it could
very well be the predominating question for the class, even though individual circumstances varied. Now that the Court has upheld certification as an
injunctive class, however, revisiting damages class certification is pointless.
The action will proceed as an injunctive class devoid of critical due process
protections.
If Jacobsen II has a silver lining, it comes in the practical dilemma of
pursuing monetary damages through future injunctive class actions. If damages cannot be assessed until subsequent individualized trials, then the economic incentive of bringing an initial class action is significantly diminished. For class counsel, there is no guarantee individual class members will
pick up the baton and carry their individual claims to the finish line, especially if they are satisfied with injunctive and declaratory relief. The questionable outcomes of individualized trials should encourage plaintiffs to
consider damages class certification instead, despite its burdensome notice
and opt-out provisions.
Time will tell if Jacobsen II inadvertently stems the tide of inappropriate injunctive classes. Today, however, the due process gaps in the majority
opinion portend stormy seas ahead for class opponents as well as the unlucky absent members of mandatory classes. With ambiguous standards,
shoddy due process, and the potential morass of hundreds of individual
suits to follow, Jacobsen II has made the waters substantially rougher.

242. Only three paragraphs of the appellee’s brief discuss the alternative certification under (b)(3).
Appellee’s Response Br., Jacobsen II, 2012 WL 3570015 at *47 (Mont. Aug. 6, 2012) (No. DA120130).
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